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Abstract: 
Both researchers and practitioners have not reached a consensus regarding logics of China's 
political reform and to what extent CCP is pushing the political innovation, nor they mapped a 
clear picture on where the political reform is leading to. Most of scholars beg the questions on 
‘is China’s political reform a way forward or backward in the transition process, and what are 
the core differentiations between CCP’s political reform understanding and Western’s 
democratic values. This paper attempts to figure out the 'Road Map' of china's political reform 
and analyses the CCP’s rationales as adaptive CCP without damaging its ruling position, 
strengthening the state’s governing abilities, and incrementlly trial on granting more power to 
the civil society and experimenting direct election at the village level. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In August 2010, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao delivered a prominent speech warning that 
China’s economy and national modernization process would be jeopardized if the country 
failed to undertake systemic political reform (Gilboy and Heginbotham, 2010). Political 
analysts argue that the fifth conference of 17th Party Congress in 2010 launches the new stage 
of China’s political reform and signals the political reform will be at the forefront in the next 30 
years (Zheng, 2010)1.  
Since the Open Reform policy in 1978, China’s economic development has created a miracle in 
the community of world economy. In recent global financial crisis, China’s economic growth 
still keeps at a pace of 9% increase annually, though it had been affected by a series of natural 
disasters, such as the earthquake in May 2008 and current economic crisis (BBC, 2009)2. Under 
the aura of the economic boost, China is confronting the difficulties of balancing the economic 
development and political reform. Researchers and practitioners beg the questions on: ‘is 
China’s political reform a way forward or backward in the transition process; and is the 
understanding of CCP’s political reform the same as Western’s democratic values. 
Scholars on Chinese Political studies hold different arguments regarding how and the extent to 
which Chinese Communist Party (CCP) should push forward the political reform in the fields 
of free media, democratisation, increasing power of legislature and judicial institutions, and 
extension of direct elections from villages to townships. Radicals concede that China’s political 
reform strategy should consider Western’s mode of separation of legislature, executive, judicial 
powers and establishing the political opposition Parties as the best means to achieve democracy. 
Others argue that privatisation of land is the key foundation and prerequisite for the political 
reform cause (Xiao, 2010). However, these reforms are unachievable as they are not allowed 
under China’s Constitution and threaten the ruling position of the CCP (China’s Constitution 
and Party rules, 2007).  
Mainstream scholars agree that CCP is an adaptive Party, and attempts to maintain its 
legitimacy through a series of political reforms, such as extending its Party membership to 
people with capitals through ‘Three Representative’ under the previous President of PRC 
Zeming Jiang (16th Party Congress Report, 2002)3, implementing direct election policy in the 
rural areas; and strengthening the intra-Party democracy. This paper analyses the CCP’s 
political reform rationales that can be summarised as adaptive CCP without damaging its ruling 
position, strengthening the state’s governing abilities, and incrementlly trial on granting more 
                                                             
1 
http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/special/17wuzhongquanhui/content-0/detail_2010_10/16/2801975_0.shtml, 
accessed at 23/10/2010. 
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power to the civil society and experimenting direct election at the village level. 
2. ADAPTIVE CCP (YUSHI JUJIN) 
Even though, one of the CCP’s most stunning development stories of recent decades is China’s 
market transition and economic rise, it has been widely criticised that CCP’s political 
development is less fundamental and systemic than changes in the economic realm. Li in his 
edited book ‘China’s Changing Political Landscape’ argues that ‘CCP favours a one-Party 
monopoly of power without an independent judicial system or free media (Li, 2008: 1). In 
addition, Pei also argues that: ‘Juxtaposed against massive and positive economic and social 
changes, the pace of political change has significantly lagged behind that of economic progress’ 
(Pei, 2006: 4).  
However, this part argues that CCP’s first rationale of launching political reform is to maintain 
its ruling position as a Party, and reluctant to give away its power, while adapting itself to the 
new domestic and international circumstances. The President of Jingtao Hu emphasized in the 
17th Party Congress that CCP takes the leading role of emancipating China, is the founder of 
‘New China’ together with Chinese people, and represents the interests of all social classes and 
ethnic minorities (16th Party Congress, 2007). In order to maintain its power, CCP has been 
consistent a self-adaptive Party. Nathan (2003) argues that CCP is an adaptive Party and 
China’s political system is resilient. Nathan concludes:  
four aspects of the CCP regime's institutionalization: 1) the increasingly norm-bound 
nature of its succession politics; 2) the increase in meritocratic as opposed to factional 
considerations in the promotion of political elites; 3) the differentiation and functional 
specialization of institutions within the regime; and 4) the establishment of institutions for 
political participation and appeal that strengthen the CCP's legitimacy among the public at 
large (Nathan, 2003: 1). 
2.1 CCP’s Ideologies Adaption 
In the first place, CCP has undergone several ideological changes to adjust their positions and 
strengthen their ruling capacities. Ma and Lin argue in their book ‘Battles’ (Jiao Feng) 
demonstrates three important CCP’s ideological transformations (Ma and Lin, 2008). The first 
battle starts at the end of China’s famous Culture Revolution in 1978. Hua GuoFeng reaffirmed 
the class-oriented ideology under the influence of Mao’s Cultural Revolution guidance, and 
proposed ‘Two Whatevers’ plan (support whatever Mao’s decisions and whatever Mao’s 
guidances). The reformists, such as Hu YaoBang and Deng XiaoPing, in CCP wage the huge 
debates regarding where CCP should take the Chinese people to, and suggests the ‘Practice is 
the only criteria of judging the truth’. The first ideological battle ends at the 3rd conference of 
11th national congress, and initiatives the worldly well-know ‘Open Reform’ policy.  
The second battle begins with the ‘Capitalism or Socialism debates in 1989’ (Ma and Lin, 
2008). At the end of 1980s, the Conservatists in the CCP challenge the open reform policy, and 
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consider it as a way leading to Capitalism. The Conservatists advocates the state planned 
economy rather than market oriented reform, and negates the policies of private ownership 
including ‘The Household Contract Responsibility System’ (JiaTing LianChan ChengBaoZhi). 
In 1992, Deng XiaoPing’s renowned ‘Southern Tour’ fought against the Conservatists in the 
CCP and began Chin’a transition from an ideologically constructed social order to an 
interest-based one, from a political society to an economic one’ (Zheng, 2004: 61). In 1997, the 
Conservatists rebrand the debate of Capitalism or Socialism into the arguments between ‘Public 
and Private’, suspicious of the open reform policy violating the Marxism’s principle of 
collective ownership economy. The previous president of PRC Jiang ZeMing became the solid 
supporter of open reform policy in 1997, and continues implementing Deng’s legacy—CCP 
needs to be more pragmatic rather than pursuing old ideologies. 
Under the Presidential period of Hu JingTao, CCP continues to adapt itself in order to increase 
the ruling capabilities. Though economic expansion has generated enormous political benefits, 
such as increasing the regime’s legitimacy, emerging tensions between China’s state and society, 
enlarging gaps between the rich and poor, increased misappropriation of land, rising income 
inequality, and corruption would intensify social conflict, jeopardize economic growth, and 
undermine the CCP’s ability to govern (Tang, 2010). Under the circumstances, Hu JingTao in 
2003 articulated the ideology of ‘harmonious society’ at the 16th National Congress containing 
good governance, accountable government, rule of law and service-oriented government; and 
subsequently proposes the new ideology of ‘Inclusiveness Growth’ on the 5th APEC conference 
in 2010. Zhu elucidates this as ‘harmonious society, social justice, governing by civil society, 
decreasing the gap between the rich and poor, and expanding domestic consumption needs’ 
(Zhu, 2010)4.  
2.2 Developing Intra-Party Democracy (Dang Nei Ming Zhu) 
‘In recent years, both the Chinese authorities and the state-run media have frequently used the 
term ‘intra-Party democracy’ to describe the concept of institutionalized checks and balances 
within the CCP’ (Li, 2010: 1). In September 2009, the 4th conference of Party congress called 
for promoting democracy within the Party and intensifying the anti-corruption drive within the 
leadership (Reports of 17th Party congress, 2009)5. ‘The directives particularly stress the 
importance of intra-Party democracy, describing it as the ‘lifeblood of the Party (dang de 
shengming)’ (Li, 2010: 2), so as to enhance the CCP’s ruling capabilities. 
Xu also argued that intra-Party democracy is the solid foundation for China’s democracy 
development (Xu, 2009)6, and prerequisite for China’s people democracy (ren min mingzhu). 
Ding summarised the three parts of intra-Party democracy—‘guarantee Party member’s 
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 http://www.china.com.cn/policy/zhuanti/wzqh/2010-10/15/content_21133162.htm, accessed at 28/10/2010. 
5
 http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/40557/162824/, accessed at 28/10/2010. 
6
 http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/49150/49151/9626313.html, accessed at 28/10/2010. 
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democratic rights, improve Party’s domestic power structure and institutionalising Party’s 
democratic mechanisms’ (Ding, 2009)7. Particularly, the CCP views the grass-roots level 
intra-Party democracy as a way to connect the citizens with Party. Yu Keping, vice-deputy of 
China’s Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, also argued that intra-Party democracy 
and people’s democracy are complementary. The former is top-down or inside-out and the latter 
is bottom-up, but ideally they can meet in the middle (Yu, 2009).  
In the first place, the CCP reforms its intra-Party democracy through recruiting economic and 
technical talents into the Party. the CCP has redefined its relationship with Chinese society—a 
redefinition expressed in its "Three Represents" slogan: ‘Instead of portraying itself simply as 
the vanguard of the proletariat, the Party now claims to represent 1) society's "advanced 
productive forces," meaning especially the growing urban middle class of businesspeople, 
professionals, and high-tech specialists; 2) the promotion of "advanced culture," as opposed to 
either "feudal" traditions or modern materialism; and 3) the interests of the majority of the 
Chinese people’ (Dickson, 2003:29). 
The Party has been recruiting the kind of economic and technical expertise needed to 
promote economic modernization. The rationale here is itself two-fold: First, the CCP 
wants to be connected with the types of people it needs to achieve continued growth, 
which is a main source of the Party's contemporary claim to legitimate rule. Second, the 
CCP wants to preempt efforts by these new elites either to form their own groups in 
opposition to the Party, or to align with other regime opponents (Dickson, 2003: 28). 
Secondly, the CCP also trains the Party members annually in the Party training schools in order 
to enhance Party member’s governing abilities (zhili neli) and ensure the orderly political 
reform within the Party. For example, Shambaugh argues that: ‘one key element of the Party 
rebuilding process has been a stepped-up emphasis on mid-career training for Party and state 
cadres in the Party system’ (Shambaugh, 2008:827-828). The Party system offers a variety of 
courses in terms of political ideologies, economics, law, social culture and politics. More 
importantly, through these trainings, the CCP attempts to attain the Party’s complete political 
control and also indoctrinates intra-Party democracy theories to the backbones (the trainees) of 
the CCP. Important as it is, the Party school system is supplemented by two other similar 
national training structures, Chinese Academy of Governance (Guojiaxingzhengxueyuan), and 
‘colleges of socialism’(shehuizhuyixueyuan)that train ethnic minorities. 
Thirdly, Deng Xiaoping commented: ‘Even so great a man as Comrade Mao Zedong was 
influenced to a serious degree by certain unsound systems and institutions, which resulted in 
grave misfortunes for the Party, the state and himself’ (Deng, 1997:365). Since the 
establishment of second generation core of the leadership, Deng has transformed the elite 
politics to incremental institutionalisation (Miller, 2008). Nathan argues that: ‘ 
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The Chinese regime is in the middle of a historic demonstration of institutional stability: 
its peaceful, orderly transition from the so-called third generation of leadership, headed 
by Jiang Zemin, to the fourth, headed by Hu Jintao. Few authoritarian regimes—be they 
communist, fascist, corporatist, or personalist—have managed to conduct orderly, 
peaceful, timely, and stable successions………. China's current succession displays 
attributes of institutionalization unusual in the history of authoritarianism and 
unprecedented in the history of the PRC. It is the most orderly, peaceful, deliberate, and 
rule-bound succession in the history of modern China (Nathan, 2003:11). 
Leadership turnover and succession came under institutionalising pressure as well when the 
constitution of the PRC incorporated fixed term limits for top state posts in 1982 and 
established mandatory retirement ages for various levels within the state hierarchy (Miller, 
2008). For example, Hu Jintao’s path to the head of the fourth generation leadership 
experienced three stages—Party General Secretary, President of the State and finally Chair of 
Party and State Military Commission. It can be estimated that Xi Jinping—widely considered 
as the head of the fifth generation of CCP’s leadership, would follow the same procedures to 
become the core of the CCP’s next collective leadership. In addition, the successions to the 
Politburo standing committee is also institutionised to prevent cult of the personalism and 
power abuse as it occurred under Mao’s period. New appointments to the Politburo and its 
Standing Committee are likely to be based on considerations of competence, representation, 
and personality, in addition to calculations of factional loyalty, rather than purely depending on 
the factionalism (Miller, 2008: 71). 
Fourthly, ‘checks and balances’ in the Party is another significant element in the CCP’s 
intra-Party democracy. In recent years, CCP has penalised or imprisoned a large number of 
Party members as a result of violating Party regulations, such as, corruption and bribery. For 
example, ‘the CCP dismissed Chen Liangyu, Shanghai’s Party chief and a member of the 
Politburo, for alleged involvement in a corruption scandal’ (Pei, 2008: 229). Each year, CCP’s 
Central Discipline Inspection Commission contains around 100,000—170,000 CCP members 
and officials for various forms of wrongdoings (Pei, 2008). The CCP uses domestic checks and 
balances to discipline Party members behaviours and to maintain the Party’s legitimacy.  
The above discussed the first CCP’s political reform rationale which is to ensure the CCP’s 
controlling power by adapting itself through adaptive ideologies and intra-Party democracy to 
the new domestic and international circumstances in the transition China’s political reform. It is 
essential to point out that this part attempts not to be involved in the contentious debates 
regarding the definition of ‘democracy’, as different scholars have largely opposite views on 
China’s democracy development. Some scholars argue that CCP’s intra-Party democracy is not 
a real democracy; others argue that democracy is a universal term needs to integrate different 
nation’s culture and understandings (See Li, 2008, Pei, 2008, Yu, 2008, Li, 2009).  
Volume 7, No. 1 
68 
3. STRENGTHENING THE STATE’S GOVERNING CAPACITIES 
CCP’s second political reform rationale is to strengthen the state’s capacities through initiating 
a series of executive, legislature and judicial innovations. However, as discussed in the previous 
party, ensuring CCP’s political control is an uncompromised condition for conducting these 
reforms. The nature of adaptive Party has trickled down to the necessity of adjusting state’s 
functions, as better governance helps CCP to maintain its legitimacy. Particularly, globalisation 
is another driving force for the transformation of the state. Zheng argues that ‘despite 
difficulties, the Chinese state has made enormous efforts to adjust the governance structure to 
accommodate globalisation on the one hand, and facilitate the process of China’s integration 
into the global system on the other’ (Zheng, 2004:187).  
In addition, the Chinese government also faced internal significant challenges ahead. Inequality 
has risen sharply across regions, sectors and social groups. Corruption is rampant. Wong argued 
that: 
Especially, since 1990s, popular protest grew in size and frequency, as citizens protested 
against excessive fees and levies and increasingly, illegal land takings and evictions. the 
country has also been rocked by a series of scandals in recent years, of which the 
long-running saga of tainted milk power from Sanlu during 2007-2008, then the largest 
and most reputable milk producer in the country, was only the latest in a string that went 
from fake infant formula causing the death of hundreds of babies in 2004, the 2005 
chemical spills into the Songhuajiang that contaminated water supplies to major 
population centres in the north-east, to the mislabelling of exported chemicals that turned 
toothpastes, pet food and pharmaceuticals into deadly poisons and so on (Wong, 
2009:930). 
Therefore, CCP attempts to strengthen the state’s capacities to grapple with the pressures 
internally and externally through institutional changes, transforming the role the civil service, 
and improving the public service delivery.  
3.1 Market reform and bureaucratic restructuring 
Scholars begs the questions if China’s market reform would lead to political liberalization and 
eventually democracy. However, it is evident that China still remains an authoritarian country. 
Zhang in his book ‘Marketisation and Democracy in China’ gave a good illustration through a 
bottom-up approach by observing two different locations in China--Sunan and WenZhou 
(Zhang, 2008), arguing that ‘different patterns of economic development have produced distinct 
local-level social and political donfigurations, only one of which is likely to foster the growth 
of democratic practices’ (Zhang, 2008:2). WenZhou created an entrepreneurial-initiated 
development contributing to the economic equality and flat class structure; on the contrary, 
Sunan’s government-led development has created more inequality and polarized class structure 
(Zhang, 2008:3). 
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However, marketisation triggers the transformation of the state and bureaucratic restructuring 
indeed. There have been six main institutional reforms in China’s ‘Reform and Open Door’ 
policy since 1978. Chai summarized four institutional reforms in her article: 
The 1982 Institutional Reforms 
The 1982 institutional reforms: in December 1981, in the process of downsizing the state 
bureaucracy, the total number of ministries or agencies directly under the control of the 
State Council was cut from 100 to 61, with regard to staff, State Councils were reduced 
from 51,000 to 30,000. 
The 1988 Reform of the State Council 
This new initiative focused on transforming administrative functions with a particular 
emphasis on the redesign of departments of economic management. The plan’s long-term 
objective was to establish an administrative system that integrated the qualities of modern 
management with traditional characteristics of Chinese administration. In short-term goal 
was to balance relationship, transform functions, streamline staff, improve efficiency, 
overcome bureaucratization and increase the vitality and flexibility of central state 
organizations. 
The 1993 Institutional Reforms 
This phase of institutional reform focused on establishing an administrative system, 
which would underpin the socialist-oriented market economy. And the process of 
decentralization allowed for a process of ‘hollowing-out’ to occur at the centre. 
The 1998 Institutional Reforms 
Significant improvements have been made during this period with regard to separating 
administration from enterprise management, through the successful privatisation of 
state-owned enterprises, and improving public management and the style of service 
delivery. (Chai, 2004) 
The fifth institutional reform occurred in 2003. The central government established new 
departments, such as, State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the 
State Council, China Banking Regulatory Commission, State Food and Drug Administration, 
State Administration of Work Safety and Coal Mine Safety, Ministry of Commerce and rename 
National Development and Planning Commissiong to National Development and Reform 
Commission. In addition, the total number of ministries in State Council reduced to 28. 
The recent institutional reforms happened in 2008 branded as ‘Super Ministry Reform’ 
(DaBuZhiGaiGe), encompassing three meanings---separation of decision-making, 
implementing and supervising powers; amalgamating small ministries into ‘super ministries’ as 
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11 new ‘Super Ministries’ were established in 20088. Overall, the sixth institutional reforms aim 
to rebuild the state economic system to accommodate the market economy. Particularly, the 
establishment of National Development and Reform Commission has been considered as the 
mini-state Council implementing the major economic innovations in China. Zheng argued that: 
‘bureaucratic restructuring in China essentially refers to efforts to rationalise the bureaucratic 
state to make it more efficient’ (Zheng, 2004:83), and reduce or eliminate the shortcomings of 
inefficiency, dysfunction, overstaffing, degeneration and so on. ‘Every bureaucratic 
restructuring has aimed to provide an intstitutional foundation for the development of an 
increasingly market-oriented economy’ (Zheng, 2004:84). 
Decentralization is the second most important institutional reforms. In the process of 
State-building under a Reformist Party since the open reform policy, The CCP’s 
decentralization policies can be broadly grouped as fiscal and administrative. Fiscal 
decentralization began in 1980, which permitted each provincial government and to retain 
profits above the contracted amount for local purposes. Known as ‘eating in separate kitchens’ 
this fiscal reform was aimed at making provinces financially self-sufficient. (Zheng, 1997:216) 
Provinces especially for the coastal regions have particularly benefited from this administrative 
reform; for example, four Special Economic Zones were set up in Guangdong and FuJian 
provinces, which have enjoyed customs exemptions and preferential policy treatment to attract 
foreign capital. (Zheng, 1997:216) afterwards even the central government tends to recentralize 
again, however provincial government officials insisted that further decentralization would lead 
to more reforms.  
Even through decentralization, local government have had more autonomy than ever before, the 
leaders in Beijing often resorted to the last organizational tool that the Party centre still has, 
namely, the centrally controlled nomenclature system, especially by reshuffling provincial 
leaders. (Zheng, 1997:220) anyway in Deng’s regime, when China’s social, economic and 
international environment has been changing so dramatically, a new framework was designed 
for balancing the needs for central control and local autonomy, such as, greater authority in 
investment and resource-allocation decisions. The consequences of decentralization are fairly 
apparent; politically Chinese regimes under Deng, Jiang and Hu won supports due to people’s 
improvement of living standard, economically for the past 22 years from 1988, there was a 
national sustained an average growth rate of 9 percent and great boost of the local economy.  
3.2 Strengthening the Role of Politicized Civil Servants 
Civil service reform is designed in part to affect the behaviour of government employees, and 
China’s reforms were no exception (Burns and Wang, 2010), as civil servants are the 
decision-makers and implementers in terms of strengthening the state capabilities. The world’s 
largest country, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), established its civil service in 1993 
when it promulgated the Provisional Regulations on State Civil Servants. On April 27, 2005, 
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the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) approved the Bill of State 
Civil Service Law (CSL), which became effective on January 1, 2006. (Chan and Edward, 
2007; Burns and Wang, 2010:58).  
China’s civil service reform is embedded in the CCP’s principle of ‘Party manages the cadres’ 
(Dangguanganbu), and politicized civil service is one of the most significant characteristics of 
the civil service reform. The scope of the civil servants has been a contentious issue until the 
issue of Civil Service Law in 2006. Under the Zeng Qinghong’s instructions in 2000, the most 
senior party official in charge of cadre and personnel management, the civil service system 
need to open the door for party organizations to be incorporated into the state civil service.  
He made two main points. First, he argued that the scope of the state civil service must 
truly concretize the principle of party control of cadres, and second, the CSL must 
integrate the civil service and the existing cadre personnel management system (Chan and 
Edward, 2007:385). 
Based on comprehensive research between 2001 and 2004, the Leading Group on Drafting the 
CSL conducted workshops nationwide to study the scope of the civil service in more than 20 
provinces. In light of the new definition, the Leading Group classified the organizations of the 
central party and the State Council into three categories: ‘Units that fall with the civil service 
system; Units to be managed by reference to the Civil Service Law; Units that can adopt either 
the institute or the enterprise management system’ (Chan and Edward, 2007: 390). Overall, the 
civil service system incorporates personnel in Party organisations, people’s congress, people’s 
political consultative conferences, judicial and procuratorial organizations, personnel in 
democratic party organizations and state administration units at the both central and local 
levels. 
Some scholars argue that China’s civil service reform tends to be over-politicized and 
incompatible with the trend of neutral civil servants in the executives, particularly under the 
ideology of New Public Management and decentralisation in UK, Austrilia and New Zealand 
(Chan and Edward, 2007). However, this is not the case anymore. Richards in his book ‘New 
Labour and Civil Service’ argues that Britain’s civil service system tends to be politisized 
under the Labour government since 1997 with the increasing the number of units established 
around the Prime Minister, and using more special advisors and task forces (Richards, 2009). it 
is unreasonable to make a nomative judgement on if politisition of civier service refom will 
create bad governance. 
In addition, the CCP’s civil service reforms established a series of procedures and rules 
regarding entry to the civil service, retirement, resigniation, punishment and fixed-term tenures 
of ‘leadership position’ (Lindaozhiwu) and ‘contractual positions’(Pingrenzhiwu), bringing into 
competition mechanisms, supervision and monitoring and performance-based award systems. 
Manion described the procedures of the cadre management system and civil servants’ 
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appointment, promotion, transer and removal of Party and state leaders before the 
establishment of the national civil servants provisional rules of 1993 (Manion, 1985), compared 
to which, the management of civil service progressed into the rule-based managing mechanisms 
after 1993. According to one of senior civil servants interview, ‘this contributed to build a team 
of stable and consistent civil servants’ (Personal interview, 2010). 
Futhermore, CCP also put considerably efforts to increase civil servants’ governing capabilities 
through providing a variety of training programmes. The training programmes were initiatied 
and organised by the Organisation Department of CCP. In 2008, the National Civil Service 
Bureau issued an official document ‘the regulations of Civil Servants’ Training’, specifing 
trainnees, the length of training, trianing institutions, its link with promotion and so 
forth(NCSB, 2008)9. one of the interviewees commented: ‘I am currently studying english in 
Beijing Foreign Affairs University, and we are all selected by the Organsization Department of 
CCP as middle level leaders, after three monthes studying, we will go to Singorape National 
University to study Master of Public Administration’ (Personal Interview, 2010). More often, a 
large number of civil servants receive trainings from CCP’s Party School and Chinese 
Academy of Governance so as to enhance the governing abilities, such as how to deal with 
public crisis. 
3.3 Improving the Public Service Delivery 
Since 2003, The Chinese government has been committed to improve the public service 
delivery placed as a top priority for the government than any previous administrations, as it 
significantly influence the chinese citizen’s daily lives and is part of CCP’s state reforms to 
improve the social welfare. In 2010, The Chinese Prime Minister, Wenjia Bao, re-emphasized 
that: ‘social justice and equality is more shining than the Sun’ on the the third session at the 11th 
National People’s Congress.  
Sun argued that public services in China can be categorised as ‘administrative governmental 
services’ such as administrative approval system(Xingzhengshenpi), ‘profits 
services’(providing services of gas, electricity and water), and ‘non-profit services’(social 
securities, education and public health) (Sun, 2004:99). As a result of deepening market reform, 
the Chinese government iniatived the ‘service-oriented government’ reform so as to create a 
environmental-friendly condition for developing a fully-fledged market system.  
From 2002 to 2004 the State Council abolished or adjusted 1806 items of the system, reducing 
the number of activities requiring administrative examination and approval by 50.1 percent; 
second, it has implemented a one stop shopping service model in order to shorten procedure 
times and reduce administration costs; third, in an effort to clarify administrative 
responsibilities, it has adopted a services commitment and responsibility-investigating system 
that refrains from buck passing and punishes delinquent officials (Yu, 2008:52). 
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Chen also argued that: ‘the central government has expanded considerably financial support to 
the public service delivery’ (Chen, 2010:4). the table one shows the increasing spending on 
public services in 2009. 
 
Items Spending (Billon RMB) Increasing percentage 
compared  with  2008 
Education 749.153 17.5% 
Social Security and Employment 603.969 27.1% 
Health 263.529 29% 
Community services 359.038 11.2% 
Transportation 362.989 46.7% 
Housing 131.425 24.8% 
Source: Financial Report in 2009,9 
http://gks.mof.gov.cn/zhengfuxinxi/tongjishuju/201010/t20101015_342886.html  
Particularly, the Chinese government abolish the tuititon fees acorss the nation in the nine-year 
compulsory education system since 2008 including providing free textbooks to the household 
registered in the basic-living allowances social welfare in the city and living expenses for the 
students in poor families (Si, 2008)10.  
In addition, the Chinese government brought into the market mechanims in reforming the 
public service delivery, allowing non-state capitals into the arenas of public service delivery as 
a means to increase the efficiency (Sun, 2004). In the meanwhile, the govrnment prevented the 
market failure in providing public services through governmental regulations and supervision. 
Furthermore, through some scholars has argued that the government fails to encourage the 
increasing role of non-governmental organisations in providing public services, it actually can 
be seen that non-governmental agencies are playing more important roles on offering public 
services. For example, Xiaoyuan Shang, XiaomingWu and Yue Wu analysed how the civil 
society fills the gap in welfare provision for Vulnerable Children as the state’s role is missing 
(Shang, Wu and Wu, 2005:122). One of the interviewees commented: ‘non-governmental 
orgnaisations in China is transforming from personalism to institutionalism, in the past, 
non-governmental organisation’s development depends on its head as reputational person with 
close links with the government; but now, the non-governmental organisation’s is slowly 
getting into the rule-based development’ (Personal interview). 
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4. CCP’S TRIAL ON GRANTING MORE POWER TO CIVIL SOCIETY 
The CCP’s third political reform rationale is to incrementally granting more power to civil 
society with caution. The meaning of civil society from sociological definition is an 
aggregation of many different types of social organizations, all of whom have voluntary 
memberships (Teets, 2009: 330). However, Yang argued that: the concept of civil society has 
four basic elements (1)autonomous individuals and (2) civic associations in relation to the state, 
(3) engaged in more or less organized activities in a (4)public sphere ‘outside the immeditae 
control of the state but not entirely contained within the private sphere of the family’ (Yang, 
2010: 455). 
There are two opposite voices regarding whether China has entered the age of civil society. 
scolars in Beijing university argued that China has the characteristics of civil society, such as a 
certain number of NGOs, increasing power of citizens’ participation in the political activities, 
and internet democracy; on the contrary, scholars in Tsinghua university denies the fact that 
China has the civil society as citizens has no freedom of association and assembly.11 Although 
the CCP has been extremely vigilant about discoraging the growth of NGOs, especially since 
the ‘color revolution’ of 2004-2005 overturned autocratic governments in Georgia, Ukraine, 
and Kyrgyzstan, the party has nevertheless recognized that NGOs can play a beneficial role in 
socity. the CCP is increasingly aware of the significance of the civil society as an important 
instrument to the CCP’s governing abilities.  
4.1 The Growing Power of the Civil Society 
In recent global financial crisis, China’s economic growth still keeps at a pace of 9% increase 
annually, which in turn requires an innovation of social management as the economic 
development, on one hand, has transformed considerably the modernasization process; on the 
other hand, enlarged the gap between the rich and poor contributing to the social unease. The 
CCP considers the function of civil society complementing the state function deficit in the rural 
and less developed regions, such as Tibet.  
Yang argued that: ‘studies of civil society in reform-era China have revealed three major areas 
of change that point to an emerging civil society: (1) existing forms of social organization have 
undergone change, new associational forms have appeared, and social organizations in general 
have proliferated; (2) both social organizations and individual citizens enjoy more autonomy 
from state power than in the pre-reform decades; (3) with the changing functions of the media 
and the increase in spaces for public discussion, a nascent form of public sphere has emerged’  
(Yang, 2010: 456).  
According to the official statistics in 2010, there are over 400,000 registered social 
organisations in the Civil Affairs Dearptment in China. Yu, director of Central Compilation and 
Translation Bureau, pointed out that there are around 3000,000 social organisations existing in 
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the society.12 Particularly since 2008, China has experienced a series of devastating natural 
disasters, such as WenChuan earthquake in which death tolls reached 100,000, and YuShu 
earthquake in the north-east of QingHai province that hundreds of people passed away and 
thousands injured. The consecutive natural diasters triggers the dynamic and rapidly growing 
number of charity services. Accompanying this traedy was a significant outpouring of 
donations and volunteers, leading many analysts to speculate that, similar to the SARS crisis in 
2003, relief and reconstruction efforts will strengthen civil society in China(Teets, 2009:330).  
Participation in relief efforts increases civil society groups’ capacity through an expanded 
volunteer and donor base, improves experience in peojbect management, and demonstres to the 
government the potentially positive role played by civil society. Furthermore, The growth of 
business association, such as, chambers of commerce in Wenzhou Muncipality in Zhejiang 
Province, suggests that such groups can play an important role in regulating the economy and 
aiding government without posing a threat to the authority of the CCP. Two examples of the 
latter are the development of ‘democratic consultation meetings’ in Wenling, Zhejiang 
Province, and the implementation of the ‘public recommendation and public selection’ system 
in parts of Sichuan and Jiangsu Provinces (Li, 2008:218). 
Secondly, there seems to be a consensus that civil society is tightly under the CCP’s political 
control, and has little leeway to execute its intentions, especially in the areas of promoting 
human rights and westernised political framework. Under the current legal regulations, the 
Chinese government requires every NGO to place itself under the ‘professional management’ of 
a state organ with responsibilities in its area of work, in addition to being registered and vetted 
annually by Civil Affairs department, namely called ‘dual management system’. However, Lu 
in the paper ‘The Autonomy of Chinese NGOs: A New Perspective’ challenges two mainstream 
views in Chinese NGO studies: ‘firstly, Chinese NGOs generally lack autonomy; secondly, 
within the NGO sector, popularly organised (or bottom-up) NGOs are relatively more 
autonomous thant officially-organised (or top-down) NGOs’ (Lu, 2007:173).  
Lu argued that: ‘officially-organized NGOs in China can enjoy a great deal of de facto 
autonomy’ (Lu, 2007: 203), rather than strictly regulated by its superior organisations. In 
addition, the CCP has taken the initiatives to drafe the first ‘Charity Law’ since 2006 that is still 
under the thorough discussion in the National People’s Congress, and demonstrates its 
willingnesses to loosen the control of civil society13.  
Thirdly, individuals and organizations have more autonomy in expressing their opinions and 
participating in political activities, particularly with the internet’s popularity in the new 
technology revolution, than twenty years ago. Though the media and interet use is still under 
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the strict restriction by the CCP, chinese citizens do have more opportunities involved in the 
process of governmental policy consultation on the web, revealing improper behaviours of 
governmental officials, and expressing their concerns on social issues. the development of the 
Internet in China has given rise to online communication spaces, including chatrooms, listservs, 
newsgroups, electronic magazines, bulletin boards and so forth.  
Discussions are common regarding the topics of governance, political reform, social 
inequalities, and democratic practices on the Internet. For example, there are a large amount of 
websites and forums on the web providing the space for citizens to discuess the current Chinese 
political life, such as the website of ‘China Elections and Governance’, and ‘China Reforms’. 
In addition, China’s online spaces serve a good function of articulating social problems as a 
means to link private sphere with the politial centre (Yang, 2003: 463). Furthermore, The 
Internet also has an impact on social organizations taken as an important part of civil society in 
China. Yang concluded that ‘existing social organizations use the Internet for publicity, 
recruitment, fund-raising, and public education, of particular interest are the growing number of 
environmental groups and NGOs in China’ (Yang, 2003: 466) setting up active websites 
propogating the envionmental knowledge and revealing the environmental problems. 
More interestingly, the number of popular protest in China has been increasingly accompanied 
with the econonmic development. Since 1999, the official ‘People’s Daily Online’ sets up a 
BBS named Protest Forum for internet users to air discontent as a result of shocking event of 
bombing Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia by NATO. Unexpectedly, this triggers the popular 
protest on the internet for ordinary citizens to express their contentions. the most typical case 
includes an environmental protest in Xiamen 2007 in which the internet and text message play 
a crucial role in mobilization. In addition, ‘in recent years, appealing to state authorities through 
petitions in person, reporting to the media, and filing lawsuits have been the three most 
common methods to combat misconduct by local officials or business people closely aligned 
with the government’(O’Brien, 2008:165).  
5. EXPERIMENTING THE DIRECT ELECTION AT THE VILLAGE LEVEL 
On 5th September 2010, Chinese Premiere Wen jiabao met the previous Americian President 
James Carter, commenting that ‘direct election at the village level is an important part of 
China’s political reform, and the ultimate gola of villager’s self-rule is to enhance the citizens’ 
abilities of managing the state affairs, if villagers can successfully handle the village affairs, 
then it can be extended to a town, county, province and the state’14. The above comments 
reflect the fourth CCP’s political reform rationale that experimenting the direct election at the 
village level would explore an alternative to develop China’s democracy embedded within the 
chinese political and societal culture.  
Village elections are regarded as the core of the widely publicized basic-level political reforms 
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in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Most people in the world subscribe to the vision of a 
liberal mode of democracy and criticizes that the China’s political reform is not a democratic 
process based on the westernized criteria. However, parliament chief Wu Bangguo made the 
comments in a speech to the National People's Congress, China's annual parliament session in 
2009, that ‘China would draw on the achievements of all cultures but would not simply copy 
the West; Communist Party leadership should be strengthened and the correct political 
orientation’.15  
The first aim of experimenting direct election at the village level is to discover the new concept 
or model of democracy that adapts to the chinese circumstances. Therefore, the CCP attempts 
to develop a new model of democracy. Some scholars state that villagers’ self-rule is an 
experimental form of democracy with Chinese characteristics, and others argue that the CCP is 
to develop a ‘developmental democracy’ characterized by the pattern of first institutionalizing 
procedures resembling a democratic system and incrementally raising the level of democracy 
involved through more openness, competition (Alpermann, 2004: 197).  
The Chinese government began to promote the villagers’ self-rule (cunmin zizhi) countrywide, 
and the ‘villagers’s committee’ (cunmin weiyuanhui) that originated as a grassrots institutional 
innovation was made the key component of The Organic Law of Villagers’ Committee of the 
People’s Republic of China (promulgated in November 1998, a trial version in 1987). The 
Organic Law sets out to enforce villagers’s self-rule in all rural areas. It stipulates that the 
villagers’ committee is a self-ruling grassroots mass organization by which villagers manage 
their own affairs, and educate and serve themselves.  
The Law formulates a clear objective of promoting grassroots democracy in rural China, and 
emphasizes ‘democratic elections’ (minzhu xuanju) and ‘democratic supervision’ (minzhu 
jiandu) of the villagers’ committee, besides ‘democratic decision-making’ and ‘democratic 
management’. the Organic Law provides an institutional framework to enhance cadre 
accountability as well as empower ordinary villagers to make their own decisions, thereby 
improving village leadership and grassroots governance. Villagers are entitled to directly 
choose among themselves those who are impartial, honest and upright, and public-spirited to be 
chairman, vice-chairman, and members of their villagers’ committee in free, fair and periodic 
elections.  
Secondly, the second aim of expriemnting the direct election at the village level is to cultivate 
the citizenship consciousness. Villagers elect the members composed of Village Committee 
that make decisions regarding villagers’ daily life, such as road construction, village budgeting, 
village development plan and so on. Activities conducted by Village Committee are not taken 
as potentially damaging power to the ruling position of the CCP, but seen as a autonomous 
                                                             
15
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7932091.stm, accessed at 05/01/2011. 
Volume 7, No. 1 
78 
organ to assist of villagers’ political participation, and in most cases, discuss the village affairs. 
Many scholars believed that grassroots-level election in the Chinese villages has gradually 
cultivated the citizenship consciousness, such as the consciousness of people’s affairs are 
determined by the people, and the enthusiasm of participating actively in the public affairs 
(Chen,2005 and Li,2009). 
Thirdly, though the Organic Law sets up a framework for villagers to participate the political 
activities at the village level, the CCP is aware of the need to control the election process at the 
grass-roots level so as to maintain the CCP’s politically dominant position and retain the social 
stability. As a Party-State system, there is a unavoidable trend of conflict between ‘the two 
committees’ (Liangwei)(Village Committee and Party Committee). the Organic Law, on one 
hand, states that Party branches ‘is obliged to support villagers in developing self-governance 
and exercise their democratic rights’, on the other hand, insists that Party branches are the 
villages’ ‘leadership core’ (Lingdao Hexin).  
Currently, it is an indisputable fact that Party secretary is the actual first ruling person 
(Yibashou), and the democratically elected villager committee is subordinate to the Party 
secretary as the second ruling organ (Erbashou). This power-structure design often results in 
the collision between the two bodies. Village Committee attempts to maintain the dominant 
position from the Party committees. Whereas, with the advocate of the upper Party 
organizations, Party secretary never give away the power to intefere the village affairs. In most 
cases, it is the village cadres that lose these skirmishes. And then, as they often do, some have 
become so frustrated that they have withdrawn from the political life (O’Brien 2009). For 
example, the crucial stage of candidate nomination and selection is still seen as being too much 
controlled by Party and state administrations. The reforms of CCP at the base of the PRC’s 
political system are driven by the need to find a balance between democratic participation and 
citizens’ rights on the one hand and state and Party authority on the other (Alpermann, 
2004:198). the CCP reluctantly gives its citizens enhanced opportunities for political 
participation and merely if it serves at the same time to strengthen its authority at the 
basic-level of rural society.  
6. CONCLUSION: 
In the 21st Century, unquestionablly, China has become the most important focus all over the 
world. China’s economic achievement has been remarkable, particularly after the world 
financial crisis since 2008. The CCP’s central politburo standing committee members are 
occupied with visiting around the world and demonstrate their rising economic power to the 
world by contracing and purchasing a large amount of foreign products. On the other hand, 
China is encountering unprecedented social unrest, such as social mass movements, sucides, 
enlarging gap between the rich and the poor, and corruption. The CCP certainly is clearly aware 
of the danger of its ruling legitimacy.  
Scholars have largely differentiated views on the extent to which the CCP is willing to take 
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political reform, and what directions the CCP is leading to. This paper contributes to the 
numerous, but various, debates on the CCP’s political reform. The first part argues that CCP’s 
first rationale of launching political reform is to maintain its ruling position as a Party, and 
reluctant to give away its power, while adapting itself to the new domestic and international 
circumstances through ideologies adaption, cadre training, transformation from elite politics to 
incremental institutionalism and checks and balances in the Party. 
The CCP’s second political reform rationale is to strengthen the state’s capacities through 
initiating a series of executive, legislature and judicial innovations. The nature of adaptive Party 
has trickled down to the necessity of adjusting state’s functions, as better governance helps 
CCP to maintain its legitimacy. The CCP attempts to strengthen the state’s capacities to grapple 
with the pressures internally and externally through institutional changes, transforming the role 
the civil service, and improving the public service delivery. 
The CCP’s third political reform rationale is to incrementally granting more power to civil 
society with caution. the CCP has been extremely vigilant about discoraging the growth of 
NGOs, the party has nevertheless recognized that NGOs can play a beneficial role in socity. 
Finally, the fourth CCP’s political reform rationale that experimenting the direct election at the 
village level would explore an alternative to develop China’s democracy embedded within the 
chinese political and societal culture.  
REFERENCES 
[1] Alpermann, B., 2004, Village Govrenance and Prospects for Democracy in China, Journal 
of Contemporary China, 13(38), 195-197. 
[2] BBC, 2009, ‘China will not have democracy’, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7932091.stm, 
accessed at 05/01/2010. 
[3] BBC, 2009, ‘China Economic Growth Slows’, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7843947.stm, accessed at 22/10/2010. 
[4] Chai Hongxia, Country Profile, Administrative Reform in China, Policy studies, Vol.25, 
No.1, March 2004. 
[5] China Elections and Governance, 2009, ‘BeiDaQingHuaJiBian: 
ZhongGuoMaiJingGongMingSheHui’, (Debates between Beijing and Tsinghua Universities: 
China Strides into Civil Society?). 
http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=141318, accessed at 29/12/2010. 
[6] China Elections and Governance, 2010, ‘Wen Jiabao Yu Carter Tan Zheng Gai’, (Prime 
Minister Wen Jiabao Talks Political Reform with Ex-President Carter), 
http://www.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=186419, accessed at 05/01/2010. 
[7] Chen Jie, 2005, Popular Support for Village Self Government in China: Intensity and 
Volume 7, No. 1 
80 
Sources, Asian Survey, Vol. 45, No. 6 (November/December 2005). 
[8] China News, 2007, ‘16th Party Congress’, 
http://www.chinanews.com/gn/news/2007/10-09/1043428.shtml, accessed at 28/10/2010. 
[9] ‘Deng Xiaoping ChengWei DangNei De Di’ ErDai LingDao He Xin’ (Deng Xiaoping’s 
designation as the Party Leadership’s second-generation core), in Dang He GuoJia 
ZhongDa Juece De LiCheng, (The Course of Important Policy Decisions in Our Party and 
Country), Beijing HongQi ChuBanShe, 1997: 365-66). 
[10] Dickson, B.J. 2003, Threats to Party Supremacy, Journal of Democracy, 14.1 (2003) 
27-35. 
[11] Gilboy, G.J and Heginbotham, E., 2010, China’s Dilemma, Social Change and Political 
Reform, Foreign Affairs, Published by the Council on Foreign Relations.  
[12] Li Cheng, 2008, China’s Changing Political Landscape, Prospects for Democracy, 
Brookings Institution Press. 
[13] Li Cheng, 2010, Intra-Party Democracy in China: Should We Take It Seriously?, China 
Leadership Monitor, No.30. 
[14] Li Changping 2009, Why do Peasants Petition?, Southern Village Newspaper, 16th June. 
[15] Lu, Yiyi, 2007, The Autonomy of Chinese NGOs: A New Perspective, China: An 
International Journal, Vol 5, No 2, September, 2007: 173-203. 
[16] Manion, 1985, ‘Corruption by DesignYong Guo, ‘Corruption in Transitional China’. 
[17] Ma Licheng and Lin Zhijun, 2008, JianFeng, DangDaiZhongGuoSanCiJieFangShiLu, 
Conflict, the three-time thoughts emancipation of the Contemporary China, HuBei 
ChangJiang Publisher. 
[18] Miller, A.L.2008, ‘Institutionalization and the Changing Dynamics of Chinese Leadership 
Politics’, cited from Li Cheng, 2008, China’s Changing Political Landscape, Prospects for 
Democracy, Brookings Institution Press. 
[19] NCSB, 2008, ‘GuoJiaGongWuYuanZaiXinTiaoLi’ (the Temporary Chinese Civil Service 
Law), http://news.xinhuanet.com/employment/2008-12/03/content_10447536.htm, accessed 
at 06/11/2010. 
[20] Nathan, A.J. 2003, Authoritarian Resilience, Journal of Democracy, 14.1 (2003) 6-17. 
 
[21] O’Brien. K.J.2001, Villagers, Elections, and Citizenship in Contemporary China, Modern 
China, Vol. 27, No. 4(Oct., 2001), 407-435. 
[22] Pei Minxin, 2008, China’s Trapped Transition, The Limits of Developmental Autocracy, 
Harvard University Press. 
[23] Richards, D., 2009, NewLabour and the Civil Service: Analysing the Issue of Politisation, 
Political Educatoin Forum Journal. Vol. 2 No.1. January, 2009. 
[24] Sun, Xiaoli, 2004, Public Service Reform in China: Ideas and Strategic Challenge, Journal 
of RenMin University of China, No 5, 2004. 
Journal of Cambridge Studies 
81 
 
[25] Si Zhenglong, 2008, 
‘ZhanKaiQuanMianShiXianQiuNianYiWuJiaoYuMianFeiZhiHouXinYuanJing’ (New 
Prospects of Implementing Free Nine-Year Compulsory Education), 
http://www.chinacourt.org/html/article/200808/01/315027.shtml, accessed at 07/11/2010. 
[26] Shang Xiaoyuan, Wu Xiaoming and Wu Yue, 2005, Welfare Provision for Vulnerable 
Children: The Missing Role of the State, The China Quarterly, 2005. 
[27] Shambaugh, D. 2008, Training China’s Political Elite: The Party School System, The 
China Quarterly, 196, December 2008, 827-844. 
[28] Teets. J.C 2009, Post-Earthquake Relief and Reconstruction Efforts: The Emergence of 
Civil Society in China?, The China Quarterly, 2009. 
[29] Tang Jun, 2010, ‘PingFuChaJu—ShiShiYuYuanYing’ (Poverty Gap—Facts and Reasons), 
http://www.chinareform.net/2010/0710/18874.html, Chinareform. net. 
[30] TengXunCaiJing, 2010, ‘CiShanFaCaoAnChengXing, HuoYiShangBaoGuoWuYuan’, 
http://finance.qq.com/a/20100805/000370.htm, accessed at 29/12/2010. 
[31] Wang Xiaoqi and Burns, J.P. 2010, Civil Service Reform in China: Impacts on Civil 
Servants’ Behaviour, The China Quarterly, 201, March 2010, 58-78. 
[32] Chan,H.S and Edward, L.S.Z. 2007, Civil Service Law in the People’s Republic of China: 
A Return to Cadre Personnel Management, Public Administration Reviw, Vol 67, 383-398. 
[33] Wong, C. 2009, Rebuilding Government for the 21st Century: Can China Incrementally 
Reform the Public Sector?, The China Quarter, 200, December 2009, 929-952. 
[34] Xu Yaotong, 2009, 
‘DangNeiMingZhuDeFaZhanShiZhongGuoZhengZhiMoShiDeGuanJian’ (Intra-Party 
Democarcy is the Key of the China Political Model), 
http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/49150/49151/9626313.html, accessed at 28/10/2010. 
[35] XinHuaNet, 2005, 
‘ZhongGuoGongZhanDangDiShiLiuCiQuanGuoDaiBianDaHuiBaoGao’, (Report of 16th 
Party Congress), http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2005-01/16/content_2467718.htm, 
accessed at 22/10/2010. 
[36] Yang Guobin, 2003, The Internet and Civil Society in China: A Preliminary Assessment, 
Journal of Contemporary China, 2003, 12(36), August, 453-475. 
[37] Yu Keping, 2008, Ideological Change and Incremental Democracy in Reform-Era China, 
cited from Li Cheng, 2008, China’s Changing Political Landscape, Prospects for 
Democracy, Brookings Institution Press. 
[38] Yu Keping, 2009, ‘RangMinZhuZaoFuZhongGuo’, (Let the Democracy Serve China), 
http://www.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=143896, accessed at 30/10/2010. 
[39] Zhang, Jianjun, 2008, Marketization and Democracy in China, Routledge Studis on China 
Volume 7, No. 1 
82 
in Transition. 
[40] Zheng Hao, 2010, ‘ShiQiJieWuZhongQuanHuiChengShangQiXia, 
TuiDongSheHuiFaZhan’, (5th 17th Party Congress Linking the history, and Promote the 
Social Development), 
http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/special/17wuzhongquanhui/content-0/detail_2010_10/16/2
801975_0.shtml, accessed at 23/10/2010. 
[41] Zheng, Yongnian, 2004, Globalization and State Transformation in China, Cambridge 
University Press. 
[42] Zheng, Shiping,1997, Party vs. State in Post-1949 China: The Institutional Dilemma, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
[43] ZhongGuoGongZhanDangXinWenWang, ‘GuanZhuDaBuZhiGaiGe’ (Focusing on Super 
Ministry Reform), http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/40557/117321/index.html, accessed at 
01/11/2010. 
[44] ZhongGuoGongZhanDangXinWenWang, ‘DangNeiMingZhuJianShe’, (Intra-Party 
Construction), http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/40557/162824/, accessed at 28/10/2010. 
[45] ZhongGuoGongZhanDangXinWenWang, 
‘FaZhanDangNeiMingZhuDeLuJinYuZhongDian’, (Developing Intra-Party Democracy’s 
Routes and Key), http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/49150/49151/9668929.html, accessed at 
28/10/2010. 
[46] Zhu Lijia (2010), ‘ZhongGongShiQiDaZhaoKai, 
BaoRongXinZengZhangChengLiangDian, (5th Seventeenth Party Congress highlights the 
Inclusive Growth), 
http://www.china.com.cn/policy/zhuanti/wzqh/2010-10/15/content_21133162.htm, accessed 
at 28/10/2010. 
